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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2021.100310THE BIGGER PICTURE Just as war makes every citizen into an amateur geographer and tactician, a
pandemic makes epidemiologists of us all. Instead of maps with colored pins, we have charts of exposure
and death counts; people on the street argue about infection fatality rates and herd immunity the way they
might have debated wartime strategies and alliances in the past. The severe acute respiratory syndrome co-
ronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic has brought statistics and uncertainty assessment into public discourse
to an extent rarely seen except in election season and the occasional billion-dollar lottery jackpot. In this pa-
per, we reflect on our role as statisticians and epidemiologists and lay out some of the challenges that arise in
measuring and communicating our uncertainty about the behavior of a never-before-seen infectious disease.
We look at the problem from multiple directions, including the challenges of estimating the case fatality rate
(i.e., proportion of individuals who will die from the disease), the rate of transmission from person to person,
and even the number of cases circulating in the population at any time. We advocate for an approach that is
more transparent about the limitations of statistical and mathematical models as representations of reality
and suggest some ways to ensure better representation and communication of uncertainty in future public
health emergencies.
Proof-of-Concept: Data science output has been formulated,
implemented, and tested for one domain/problemSUMMARY
We discuss several issues of statistical design, data collection, analysis, communication, and decision-mak-
ing that have arisen in recent and ongoing coronavirus studies, focusing on tools for assessment and prop-
agation of uncertainty. This paper does not purport to be a comprehensive survey of the research literature;
rather, we use examples to illustrate statistical points that we think are important.STATISTICS AND UNCERTAINTY
Just as war makes every citizen into an amateur geographer and
tactician, a pandemic makes epidemiologists of us all. Instead of
maps with colored pins, we have charts of exposure and death
counts; people on the street argue about infection fatality rates
and herd immunity the way they might have debated wartime
strategies and alliances in the past.
The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2) pandemic has brought statistics and uncertainty assess-
ment into public discourse to an extent rarely seen except in
election season and the occasional billion-dollar lottery jackpot.
Statistical claims become political claims and vice versa, with
political and ideological positions impacting how we interpret
the meaningfulness and uncertainty of statistical results.1 As
statisticians and epidemiologists, we attempt to contribute toThis is an open access article undthis discourse by laying out some of the challenges that arise
in assessing uncertainty and propagating it through statistical
analysis and decision-making. We consider several examples
and conclude with some general recommendations.
Statistics is key throughout the life cycle of a scientific proj-
ect, from design through data collection and analysis, and
ultimately through communication of results for policy recom-
mendations. In the case of a pandemic, such as SARS-CoV-2,
surveillance data are critical for assessment of current status
and for future projection, and clinical measurements are vital
for evaluating diagnostic tests and intervention efficacy.
Design includes sample size calculations, determination of
comparison groups and time horizons, and randomization,
and is critical in research to identify effective treatments and
vaccines. Analysis includes evaluation and estimation based
on clinical studies, as well as disease modeling studies, forPatterns 2, August 13, 2021 ª 2021 The Author(s). 1
er the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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the challenge of drawing inferences and making decisions
based on a variety of models and data sources. Uncertainty
is present at each step.
DATA AND MEASUREMENT QUALITY
It is becoming painfully apparent that the numbers defining the
global burden of SARS-CoV-2 are at best uncertain and at worst
completely wrong. The bread and butter of disease surveil-
lance—cases and deaths—are both suspect, for reasons that
are only beginning to be fully understood. Studies that rely on
these as inputs, for example, for estimating transmission dy-
namics or case fatality rates, have commonly made the mistake
of considering these numbers as a given (and reliable) and do not
account for uncertainty or bias in reporting.
Incidence, prevalence, and mortality
There has been some compelling reporting on how the number of
deaths reported in the first few months of the pandemic far ex-
ceeds what would have been expected at that time of the year,
particularly in states, such as New York, along with analysis of
poor alignment between burden and testing.2 There has also
been good reporting about the confusion arising from differences
across states in reporting of COVID-19-related deaths.3 Some
states have changed how they classify deaths due to COVID-
19, leading to potential increases in death counts in some cases
(e.g., by including suspected and confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infec-
tions in Michigan) and reductions in death counts in others (e.g.,
Colorado’s removal of individuals with COVID-19 at the time of
death but for which COVID-19 was not the attributed cause of
death from the official COVID-19 death count).4,5
One big question in the early phases of the pandemic was un-
derstanding how changes in test availability and distribution both
between regions and groups, and over time (for example, as a
result of inadequate infrastructure and reagent shortages),
impacted our measurements of incidence, prevalence, andmor-
tality, conditional on age and other demographic variables. As
the pandemic has worn on and the political and economic costs
of high SARS-CoV-2 caseloads have become clear, these issues
remain but have shifted from supply considerations to more so-
cial ones. For example, political and economic calculations
appear to have impacted the accuracy of reporting of nursing
home deaths in New York State and may have contributed to a
decline in asymptomatic surveillance testing in some states.6,7
Since progress in the pandemic in the US has often been as-
sessed using state-to-state comparisons, this has likely led to
erroneous conclusions about what works and what does not,
as well asmisrepresenting the overall trajectory of the pandemic.
Missing data can also have serious implications formaking be-
tween-group comparisons. For example, recent work has shown
that race/ethnic disparities in COVID-19 incidence and mortality
are likely to be dramatically underestimated in complete-case
analyses when cases missing race/ethnicity are dropped.8 This
suggests that the horrific disparities in COVID-19 incidence
and mortality are likely even larger than those reported in schol-
arly research and administrative reports. It could be possible to
leverage missingness of key covariates. For example, death cer-
tificates typically have more complete information on race/2 Patterns 2, August 13, 2021ethnicity than case reports, and a joint model could allow us to
efficiently marginalize over these missing covariates, which in
preliminary work reveals disparities in mortality that are consid-
erably greater than when these data are dropped. Here, we are
using census data to inform the probability that people who
are missing race/ethnicity data will be in the mortality versus
case-only data.
One way to address data quality is to triangulate. In a clinical
study, a hospital can perform antibody tests and RT-PCR RNA
tests on patients. In a study tracking symptoms, data can be
collected from multiple sources, as in the Carnegie Mellon proj-
ect, which tracks Facebook and Google surveys, hospital re-
cords, web searches, and flu tests.9 When measurements
cannot be easily calibrated, inferences can be sensitive to as-
sumptions; for example, results of the controversial Stanford
antibody study were dependent on assumptions about the
sensitivity and specificity of the test.10,11 One additional chal-
lenge is the communication of uncertainty in these tests: there
is a desire to imagine that the binary test results are conclusive
one way or the other instead of essentially representing a prob-
abilistic statement about whether an individual is infected
or not.
Transmission dynamics
These issues are no less pronounced when contemplating pop-
ulation-level transmission dynamics. The basic reproduction
number, R0, and its cousin the effective reproduction number,
R, which measures the actual number of infections generated
by an average case, are often cited as measures of inter-human
transmissibility and epidemic control. However, it is easy to
forget that R0and R are not empirical quantities. They are esti-
mated on the basis of surveillance data, which as noted above,
is not as reliable as we might wish to believe. In addition, R is a
function of (1) the per-contact infectiousness of each individual
and (2) the rate at which those contacts occur. Reduce either
or both of these and you are likely to reduce the rate of spread.
In addition, both measures represent average estimates of a
parameter subject to between-individual and temporal variation,
due, for example, to variable compliance with social distancing
efforts, variation in the extent of viral shedding or age-specific
differences in contact and infectiousness. This variation is widely
understood in infectious disease epidemiology, and there are
theoretical and statistical modeling frameworks that allow us to
account for inter-individual variability in susceptibility and infec-
tiousness.
Drivers of variation in infectiousness and susceptibility at an in-
dividual or population level can be studied using a hierarchical
approach. In this area, there are at least three key dimensions
of uncertainty that we need to consider: (1) What range of values
of the average infectiousness is consistent with the observed
data? (2) How much between-individual variation is there in
infectiousness/susceptibility, and how much does it matter to
address it specifically? (3) If we implement an intervention to
reduce the value of R0, how can we estimate howwell it worked?
The Imperial College group has fit some reasonable models
trying to untangle effects of different policies on the spread of co-
ronavirus, making use of variation in space and time of the
growth rates of the infection, and similar issues arise with varia-
tion in vaccine uptake.12,13
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VACCINES
Part of designing a study is accounting for uncertainty in effect
sizes. Unfortunately there is a tradition in clinical trials of making
optimistic assumptions to claim high power. Here is an example
that came up inMarch, 2020. A doctor was designing a trial for an
existing drug that he thought could be effective for high-risk co-
ronavirus patients. He contacted one of us to check his sample
size calculation: under the assumption that the drug increased
survival rate by 25 percentage points, a sample size of N = 126
would assure 80% power. (With 126 people divided evenly in
two groups, the standard error of the difference in proportions
is bounded above byO(0.5*0.5/63 + 0.5*0.5/63) = 0.089, so an ef-
fect of 0.25 is at least 2.8 standard errors from zero, which is the
condition for 80% power for the z-test.) When we asked the doc-
tor how confident he was in his guessed effect size, he replied
that he thought the effect on these patients would be higher
and that 25 percentage points was a conservative estimate. At
the same time, he recognized that the drug might not work.
We asked the doctor if he would be interested in increasing his
sample size so he could detect a 10 percentage point increase
in survival, for example, but he said that this would not be
necessary.
It might seem reasonable to suppose that a drug might not be
effective but would have a large individual effect in case of suc-
cess. But this vision of uncertainty has problems. Suppose, for
example, that the survival rate was 30% among the patients
who do not receive this new drug and 55% among the treatment
group. Then in a population of 1,000 people, it could be that the
drug has no effect on the 300 of people who would live either
way, no effect on the 450 who would die either way, and it would
save the lives of the remaining 250 patients. There are other pos-
sibilities consistent with a 25 percentage point benefit—for
example, the drug could save 350 people while killing 100—
but we will stick with the simple scenario for now. In any case,
the point is that the posited benefit of the drug is not "a 25 per-
centage point benefit" for each patient; rather, it is a benefit on
25% of the patients. And, from that perspective, once we have
accepted the idea that the drug works on some people and
not others—or in some comorbidity scenarios and not others—
we realize that "the treatment effect" in any given study will
depend entirely on the patient mix. There is no underlying num-
ber representing the effect of the drug. Ideally one would like to
know what sorts of patients the treatment would help, but in a
clinical trial it is enough to show that there is some clear average
effect. Our point is that, if we consider the treatment effect in the
context of variation between patients, this can be the first step in
a more grounded understanding of effect size.
Many other issues arise when considering clinical trial designs
in a pandemic, most notably balancing the goal of reducing un-
certainty about the treatment effect and the goal of getting a
treatment or vaccine into the population as soon as possible.
We recommend that policymakers attempt to quantify the po-
tential risks and benefits of early or late decisions in the design
stage, rather than relying on power calculations based on statis-
tical significance.
One issue that arises is what to make of different vaccine effi-
ciency estimates coming from studies conducted at differentpoints in time, in different contexts, and potentially with a differ-
ential mix of pathogens floating around? The estimates that are
commonly reported refer to symptomatic infection. For the pur-
poses of arresting the toll of mortality in the COVID-19 pandemic,
it is most important that vaccines prevent severe disease and
death. From this perspective, all the available options do a
good job. Arguably this is the number that should be emphasized
for the public.DISEASE TRANSMISSION MODELS
Infectious disease transmission models have been held to un-
precedented and deserved scrutiny during the COVID-19 crisis.
The field of infectious diseasemodeling finds its roots in the work
of Ross14 on malaria, using mathematical tools to describe the
complex relations between parasites, vectors, and hosts. Ross
defined the concept of dependent happenings, whereby the fre-
quency of an event, such as an infection in an individual, de-
pends on the number of individuals already affected.15 Kermack
and McKendrick16 formalized this approach, leading to the
development of the SIR (susceptible-infectious-recovered) dif-
ferential equation system that is still the basis of many of the
models used for SARS-CoV-2 today. In the SIR model, the pro-
cesses of contagion and immunity are modeled following the
mass action principle: the incidence of new infections is depen-
dent on the proportion of infectious and susceptible individuals
in the population, assuming homogeneous mixing. In the
following decades, the field of infectious disease modeling has
seen tremendous development but has long been kept sepa-
rated from statistical modeling and inference. The focus was
on putting theory into equations and exploring different sce-
narios, leading to important developments in the development
and understanding of interventions aimed at controlling epi-
demics, such as vaccines or vector control. Until recently,
comparatively less attention has been given to statistical con-
cepts, such as inference, measurement, and uncertainty.
Several types of approaches have been used to model the
transmission of SARS-CoV-2, depending on the stage of the
epidemic and the objectives of the work.
Whether the objective of a model is inference, forecasting, or
intuition-building, the handling of uncertainty should be a central
concern. We can distinguish three sources of uncertainty:
1. Stochastic uncertainty arises from chance events during the
course of transmission (whether a contact between an infec-
tious and a susceptible person will result in transmission) or
data generation (sampling variation in infected individuals
that are reported as cases).
2. Parameter uncertainty represents the imperfect level of
knowledge of a particular quantity, such as the average dura-
tion of the incubation period, which is a fixed input parameter
to most transmission models.
3. Model (or structural) uncertainty refers to the set of assump-
tions underlying any modeling attempt and their adequacy
to reality.17 To avoid overconfidence, especially when results
are expected to impact policy, one should acknowledge and
discuss the potential impact of each of these sources of un-
certainty, and as often as possible directly propagate the un-
certainty into the results.Patterns 2, August 13, 2021 3
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reports
In the early stages of the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 in Wuhan,
China, a key focus was estimating the basic reproduction num-
ber R0 from data on reported cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection. R0
is defined as the average number of secondary cases that are
generated by an infectious individual in a fully susceptible popu-
lation. In the first few weeks after its emergence, it was reason-
able to assume that the population was fully susceptible to
SARS-CoV-2 infection, allowing the use of simple models based
on branching processes or exponential growth. Estimating
R0from counts of reported cases constitutes a typical inference
problem and must account for important considerations
regarding stochastic, parameter, and model uncertainty.
Stochastic uncertainty
In the context of emerging pathogens, stochastic uncertainty
can be important and, at the stage at which few people are
affected, any outlier behavior can have a strong impact on the
course of the disease. One key component here is the assumed
distribution in the number of secondary cases. In a totally sus-
ceptible population, its average is by definitionR0, but this can
vary from individual to individual, with the extreme being a super-
spreading event (defined as an unusually large number of sec-
ondary cases generated by a single infectious person). Super-
spreading events can have a considerable impact in the early
stages of disease emergence by accelerating the spatial spread
of the pathogen, as was seen during the emergence of Middle
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus.18 Two introductions of
the same pathogen with the same transmissibility (i.e., with the
same R0) can result in vastly different epidemic trajectories.
Consequently, it would be a mistake to overinterpret differences
in case counts across countries or areas as differences in trans-
missibility, especially when the number of cases is small. Simi-
larly, the uncertainty stemming from low case rates constrains
the ability to make informative comparisons across time and
space, for instance, to identify the causal impact of specific miti-
gation measures or environmental drivers, such as temperature
or air pollution.19 Individual heterogeneity and the potential for
superspreading events can be accounted for using a negative
binomial distribution for modeling the number of secondary
cases.20
Parameter uncertainty
Examining the mechanisms leading to the generation of count
data gives insight about the basic assumptions that will explicitly
or implicitly be part of any attempt at parameter estimation: (1) an
initial zoonotic event led to the infection of a number of humans
on a given date; (2) each of these cases generated secondary
cases (R0 cases on average, with a distribution as discussed
above); (3) each of these secondary cases generated cases,
with a delay that corresponds to the generation time (the gap be-
tween two successive generations of cases, which also is a
random variable, not a constant); (4) infected cases will have
an incubation period, some of the cases will have symptoms,
some of the symptomatic cases will seek care, some of the pa-
tients will be tested and diagnosed, some of the diagnosed will
be reported to the authorities and counted as a case. From these
observations, we understand that is not possible to estimate at4 Patterns 2, August 13, 2021the same time R0, the date and size of the initial zoonotic event,
the incubation period, and the generation time from information
about the incidence of SARS-CoV-2, as several combinations of
these parametersmay lead to the same data. To estimateR0, it is
therefore necessary to incorporate external information about
the other parameters. Here enters parameter uncertainty, as
overconfidence about the initial conditions or the generation
time could result in both systematic bias in estimation and over-
confidence—not enough uncertainty—about the value of R0.
Model uncertainty
Thinking about themechanisms of data generation brings further
considerations about model uncertainty. As of April 2021, much
remains unknown about the specific factors, timing and location
of the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 at the end of 2019.21 Putting
aside any political aspect, the early phase of emergence of an
unknown pathogen is always a chaotic matter, and modeling
the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and other emerging pathogens
requires strong assumptions about how the data were gener-
ated. For instance, some authors took the number of reported
cases in Wuhan in the first few weeks at face value and directly
inferred the rate of exponential growth and thus R0, implicitly
assuming that the proportion of ascertainment (the proportion
of cases that end up in the data) was constant over the period
considered.22,23 Other authors made explicit assumptions about
the shape of variation of ascertainment with time.24 Rather than
making assumptions about ascertainment in Wuhan, other au-
thors preferred to use data on national and international cases
of SARS-CoV-2 identified in areas still unaffected by the turmoil
together with traffic data.25–27 However, this approach carries
other assumptions about the representativity of people who trav-
eled from Wuhan to other places. Differences across estimates
based on different assumptions may be referred to as model un-
certainty, and this in itself is a good reason to consider multiple
approaches to study the same issue.
Accounting for nonstationarity
Beyond the first few weeks following emergence, it becomes
more and more implausible to ignore the impact on transmission
of disease-related behavior and the accumulation of protective
immunity in the population. Whether the objective is prediction
or inference, it is essential to account for how behavior and other
factors contributing to transmission—and observation—may
change over time. The two broad categories of transmission
models typically employed can be adapted to this task, but it in-
creases challenges of model identifiability and interpretability.
Agent-based models can be used to simulate the detailed
behavior and biology of each individual, going as far as to simu-
late every vehicle moving in a country.28 These models can pro-
vide useful insight but are often difficult or impossible to fit to
data. In contrast, compartmental models divide the population
into different states (susceptible, infectious, and removed for
the classical SIR model), without considering any difference
among individuals within a state.
Compartmental modelsmay be consideredwithin a stochastic
or a deterministic framework. The stochastic framework con-
siders the probability of occurrence of each event at each time
step and, as hinted by its name, is better suited to handle sto-
chastic uncertainty. The deterministic framework relies upon
Table 1. Summary of the different sources of uncertainty and









- acknowledge variability at all
levels by using appropriate
probability distributions
- present the entire range of
possible predictions arising
from the fitted model rather








- propagate uncertainty from
parameters through the results
and predictions
- make use of Bayesian
hierarchical models to partially
pool information across








- maximize transparency with
open code and public release
of data to allow replication
- pre-register modeling
assumptions in advance of
analysis
- compare the inferences and
predictions of multiple plausible
models rather than searching
for the ‘‘one true model’’
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leads to the same average results when the number of infected
is sufficiently large. The reduction in computational cost associ-
ated with solving ODEs instead of simulating a large number of
events is important when the objective is inference.29
Alternative approaches. A third, hybrid approach was devel-
oped by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME),
fitting a Gaussian curve to the shape of the epidemic’s
mortality trajectory, estimating how restrictions, including social
distancing enacted in China impacted the time to and height of
the peak, and then extrapolating to other settings on the basis
of their accumulating mortality data. The assumption of symme-
try in the rise and fall of cases, coupled with the rapid rise in
cases and deaths in almost every region, meant that the IHME
model predicted a much more rapid decline than other
models.30,31 As the virus spread across the US, problems with
the model became clear, and the IHME replaced it with a hybrid
empirical compartmental approach.
Following this and other failed attempts at prediction, people
have mostly given up on forecasting the incidence of COVID-
19 beyond a few weeks. While transmission models bring impor-
tant insights about the general dynamics of an epidemic (e.g.,
concepts, such as herd immunity, vaccine threshold, and final
epidemic size), after a year in it is now more widely understood
that the incidence of COVID-19 cases and deaths at a given
time and place depends on toomany converging factors to allow
useful forecasting. These factors range from diversity in the viral
population, potential seasonality in transmissibility and contact,
to variations in risk perception, care-seeking behavior, and vac-cine uptake that can in turn be influenced by age, education, and
socio-economic status. To some extent, this represents some-
thing of a bright spot, or at least a lesson learned about the limits
of models and data as tools for decision-making in a complex,
fast-moving situation.How can we make better use of models to measure and
manage uncertainty?
None of this is an argument against using transmissionmodels to
look at potential epidemic trajectories; rather we are arguing for
greater transparency and humility in making projections. Exam-
ples of how to accomplish this include the following recommen-
dations, summarized in Table 1:
Model-based predictions should incorporate stochastic un-
certainty by including prediction intervals in addition to point
estimates. For time series predictions, visualizations of entire
trajectories using tools, such as spaghetti plots, showing the
impact of propagating uncertainty throughout the run of amodel,
should be preferred over simply plotting the intervals over time.
Parameter uncertainty should directly be propagated in the re-
sults. The quantification of uncertainty in the model outcomes is
an integral part of the results and should not be relegated to the
side as sensitivity analyses. In this regard, the Bayesian frame-
work with its focus on parameter probability distributions is
attractive.
Model uncertainty can be handled by carefully considering
whether the model structure and all relevant assumptions
(even implicit) are adapted to the question as well as using tech-
nical tools, such as stacking.32 Conducting sensitivity analyses
with alternative models is always sensible, but there is only so
much than a team can do about its own model. It is advisable
to rely on other researchers and experts to provide critical
assessment of the model by releasing code and data on an
appropriate platform. Model uncertainty is best assessed by
the community, and this requires transparency. Code sharing
will also bring to academiamuch-needed good practices for pro-
gramming, and in the long run build more confidence in the field
of infectious disease modeling. Ideally, this process of collective
validation would take place before new emergencies occur, in
some sort of disaster model pre-registration. Disease transmis-
sion models are often not entirely disease specific but rather
have defining features that relate to the modes of transmission
and immunization. This appears in the profound influence that
influenza models and other SEIR-like models had over models
applied to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.MULTILEVEL STATISTICAL MODELING
So far, we have discussed accounting for uncertainty in research
design, data collection, and transmission modeling during epi-
demics. In addition, data analysis using regression and regres-
sion-like models can account for uncertainty and variation using
multilevel modeling all the way, and decision-making can be
based on costs and benefits estimated using model outputs,
and not statistical significance. We have relatively little to say
about statistical analysis of this sort because this is one area in
which there are readily available tools to handle uncertainty
and variation.Patterns 2, August 13, 2021 5
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of multilevel models and Bayesian inference. The report by Un-
win et al.12 is an analysis by the Imperial College group that
partially pools across US states, and they have presented similar
analyses for Europe.33,34 Zelner et al.35 used a multilevel
approach to capture age-specific and race-ethnic variation in
SARS-CoV-2 mortality in Michigan. A partial list has been
collected of SARS-CoV-2 projects using the Bayesian inference
engine Stan.36 Bayesian analysis can also be performed in the
data collection stage, allowing more efficient designs.37
A challenging issue with statistical models fit during an
ongoing epidemic is dealing with unobserved or partially
observed data. Well-designed dynamic models that account
for time-varying observation processes can deal with some of
these issues, but approaches for fitting stochastic dynamic
models to partially observed time series data, such as the
partially observed Markov process framework,38 are typically
more computationally and technologically challenging than
more familiar regression-like approaches for fitting deterministic
models. As a result, deterministic models have had wide influ-
ence, despite their weaknesses and often in situations where de-
mographic stochasticity of the transmission process should be
accounted for.
Somewhat ironically, early statistical inferences for epidemic
models were actually rooted in a stochastic approach known
as the TSIR (time series SIR) model which was originally used
to account for time-varying birthrates and demographic sto-
chasticity in models of measles transmission.39 An appealing
aspect of the TSIR is that it is just a transformation of a regression
model and so is accessible to researchers and policymakers
with statistical training. Unfortunately, due to the data prepara-
tion required to fit them, TSIR models are most useful for the
analysis of strongly immunizing infections, such as measles, in
which the susceptible population can be accurately recon-
structed using data on birthrates and historical measles inci-
dence. As a result, for other infections characterized by different
dynamics, more complex and technically challenging ap-
proaches, such as the aforementioned partially observed Mar-
kov process framework, have become useful.
COMMUNICATION
To effectively communicate the results of analyses conducted
during the pandemic, what they are meant to accomplish needs
to be clear. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, this raises
the problem of effective scientific communication to the central
place it has always belonged. This includes communication of
key dimensions of uncertainty in risk.40 One of the key challenges
here is familiar: How does one impart a gestalt understanding of
an interval statistic, such as a confidence or credible interval, to
as broad of an audience as possible? van der Bles et al.41 pro-
vide evidence that people recognize uncertainty when presented
as an interval and that communicating this openly does not un-
dermine trust in the numbers or message, with verbal expres-
sions of uncertainty being less effective. Another challenge re-
lates to communication of the different ways in which
uncertainty arises and the difficulty of picking one apart from
another. For example, what do we do when we cannot disen-
tangle process noise, observation noise, and observation bias?6 Patterns 2, August 13, 2021We recommend more emphasis on accurately communicating
uncertainty in model inferences and predictions, as discussed
by Hullman et al.42
Much of the controversy surrounding themultiple transmission
models used for prediction and planning could be mitigated by a
more pragmatic reframing of what these—and all mathematical
and statistical models—are all about. Namely, they distill as-
sumptions and data into inferences for outcomes of interest. Un-
derstood this way, they are primarily tools for dimension reduc-
tion and exploration, rather than divining rods.
One thing we keep hearing in conversations with state govern-
ment officials is a concern that people just do not understand
when they are at risk. Maps and other visuals can give a realistic
and visceral sense of what that risk looks like. Many questions of
science communication arise here that relate specifically to the
translation of theory into models and models into spoken and
written language.43 Also relevant whenmapping science into de-
cisions is what Blastland et al.44 call "evidence communication,"
where the goal is not to convince or nudge people to act in a
particular way but rather to "offer evidence in the round" by
conveying estimated quantitative benefits and harms, including
numerical uncertainty measures, and anticipating and respond-
ing to potential areas of confusions.
Another problem relates to the communication of uncertainty
in the structure of the models themselves. We have seen an
appetite both from the public and from modelers themselves to
find the one true model, with the George Box quote proclaiming
that ‘‘all models are wrong’’ (which, like the term "social
distancing," we hope never to hear again after this year) tacked
on to papers and talks as a fig leaf. But we believe the only way
forward is to truly metabolize this argument: What if the chal-
lenges and failures of prediction and forecasting in this
pandemic are not to be overcome by more elbow grease and in-
genuity, but instead require moving the inferential and predictive
goalposts to better align with what the available data can tell us?
INFORMATION AGGREGATION AND DECISION-MAKING
In addition to quotidian difficulties of accounting for uncertainty
that have occupied statisticians and epidemiologists for hun-
dreds of years, the pandemic setting adds challenges of ur-
gency, novelty, high stakes, and nonstop change.
There has been vigorous debate in the newsmedia, social me-
dia, and governments regarding possible future paths of the
epidemic and how best to mitigate it. One thing that troubled
us in the earliest phases of the pandemic response was the
emphasis on rapid analysis of complex, incomplete datasets,
followed by rapid publication and extensive media coverage.
Rapid response is not inherently problematic, but the conjuring
of theoretical frameworks and analytic tools on the fly is unlikely
to benefit many more people than the authors of the study.
Instead, this makes more sense when you have an existing
framework and set of tools that you can apply with minor modi-
fications to incoming data, as was the case with a number of
groups enlisted in the earliest days of the pandemic, including
IHME as well as Imperial and other groups.
This leads us to wonder whether some kind of disaster model
pre-registration is in order for future events, so that the generic
behavior of the set of potential tools is well understood before
ll
OPEN ACCESSPerspectivebeing pressed into services. This could be looser than a clinical
trial registration but at least gives the key data inputs and outputs
and some characterization of expected behavior under different
scenarios. Critically, some type of standardization would give the
ability to engineer connections between different types of ana-
lyses, so that information on, for example, variable PCR testing
across geographic areas and demographic groups, can be
easily used to inform estimates of disease incidence and prev-
alence.
This takes us back to the motivating question behind this
essay: How can we adequately account for uncertainty in a
pandemic? The question is probably better reframed as: How
can we be better prepared to address the uncertainty inherent
in the response to the next pandemic or another catastrophic,
unforeseen—but foreseeable—event. An answer to this question
may lie in a reimagining of the tools of epidemiological modeling
from something that looks a bit more like the engineering
perspective and a bit less like the "pure science" perspective.
This entails a move away from analyses as one-off exercises
that uncover some permanent—or at least durable—truth, to-
ward a more software-like, continuous improvement conception
of the products of statistical analysis.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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38. Ionides, E.L., Nguyen, D., Atchadé, Y., Stoev, S., and King, A.A. (2015).
Inference for dynamic and latent variable models via iterated, perturbed
Bayes maps. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 112, 719–724.8 Patterns 2, August 13, 202139. Wakefield, J., Fisher, L., Bauer, C., Dong, T., Minin, V., and Fintzi, J. (2017).
Spatial discrete-time infectious disease models for surveillance data. http://
idmod.org/sites/default/files/Wakefiled_Spatio-temporal_modeling_for_
infectious_disease.pdf.
40. Spiegelhalter, D., Pearson, M., and Short, I. (2011). Visualizing uncertainty
about the future. Science 333, 1393–1400.
41. van der Bles, A.M., van der Linden, S., Freeman, A.L.J., and Spiegelhalter,
D.J. (2020). The effects of communicating uncertainty on public trust in
facts and numbers. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 117, 7672–7683.
42. Hullman, J., Qiao, X., Correll, M., Kale, A., and Kay, M. (2019). In pursuit
of error: a survey of uncertainty visualization evaluation. IEEE Trans.
Vis. Comput. Graph. 25, 903–913. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/
document/8457476.
43. Douglass, R. (2020). How to be curious instead of contrarian about
COVID-19: eight data science lessons from coronavirus perspective.
https://rexdouglass.github.io/TIGR/Douglass_2020_How_To_Be_Curious_
Instead_of_Contrarian_About_Covid19.nb.html.
44. Blastland, M., Freeman, A.L.J., van der Linden, S., Marteau, T.M., and
Spiegelhalter, D. (2020). Five rules for evidence communication. Nature
587, 362–364.About the Authors
Jon Zelneris an assistant professor in the Dept. of Epidemiology and Center
for Social Epidemiology and Population Health at the University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor MI USA.
Julien Riou is with the University of Bern and Swiss Federal office of Public
Health, Liebefeld, Switzerland.
Ruth Etzioni is a professor in the Division of Public Health Sciences at the Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Institute, Seattle, WA USA.
Andrew Gelman is a professor of statistics and political science at Columbia
University, New York, NY USA.
